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REFORMS TO CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS: NEW 
PATTERNED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH 
ACCOUNT FOR THE 
EXPERIENCE OF THE 
BATTERED WOMAN WHO KILLS 
HER BATTERING MATE 
Deborrah Ann Klis* 
"I was transfixed with horror, and over me there 
swept the sudden conviction that hanging was a 
mistake - worse, a crime. It was my awakening to 
one of the most terrible facts of life - that justice 
and judgment lie often a world apart."1 
Few issues in the American legal system evoke such varied, 
yet often passionate, arguments as those surrounding the legal 
treatment of the battered woman who kills her battering mate.2 
One view holds that society places a great value on human life 
and that a battered woman must look to restraining orders, shel-
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1994. My sincere thanks to Vir-
ginia Harmon, Kimberly Dunworth, Professor Joan Howarth, and Professor Susan 
Rutberg for their invaluable assistance. This paper is dedicated to Eleanor R. Shuler, my 
mother, and Suzanne R. Harper, my dear friend, both of whom support me 
immeasurably. 
1. Emmeline Pankhurst, My Own Story, in THE QUOTABLE WOMAN 245 (Elaine 
Partnow ed., 1977). 
2. Debra J. Saunders, If Helplessness Could Kill, S.F. CHRON" May 24, 1993, at A14 
("[Tlhere's the claim that women with BWS suffer from 'learned helplessness,' which 
makes them incapable of leaving their husbands and presumably is a justification of 
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tersS and criminal prosecution of the batterer in order to resolve 
her problems.· 
On the other hand, proponents of reform to self-defense ju-
risprudence argue that many battered women are powerless 
against their battering mates and recognize that the constructs 
of battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness theory 
often render the fatal acts defensive rather than retaliatory. 
Notwithstanding the defensive nature of the fatal act, the bat-
tered woman who kills confronts the presumption that the in-
tentional killing was done with malice.1I The battered woman 
confronts inadequate legal defense doctrines to either rebut the 
presumption of malice, or instead, to demonstrate that the use 
of force was justified for full acquittal. The following analysis 
focuses on the plight of the battered woman who, by refusing to 
take one more beating, becomes a criminal in the justice system. 
California penal law distinguishes murder from manslaugh-
ter by determining whether the perpetrator harbored malice at 
the time of the fatal act.8 Under California law, a presumption 
3. Tom Levy, Reining in Rage on the Homefront, S.F. CHRON., September 8, 1992, 
at D3. A San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium joined forces with designer, Liz 
Claiborne, to push domestic violence to the top of San Francisco's issues list. The article 
noted a worsening crisis, namely that "four-fifths of battered women needing emergency 
shelter must be turned away." Id. 
4. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 174 (Ct. App. 1989). In Aris, the defendant 
killed her battering mate while he slept. The court permitted generalized testimony of 
battered woman's syndrome at trial; however, the expert witness was not permitted to 
testify as to whether the defendant personally suffered from battered woman's syn-
drome. The jury found Aris guilty of second degree murder and sentenced her to 15 
years to life in prison. In May 1993, California Governor Pete Wilson granted clemency 
to Aris, thereby commuting her sentence to 12 years to life and allowing her to be con-
sidered for parole sooner. Id. 
5. This presumption applies to all intentional killings. See; e.g., People v. Bobo, 3 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 756 (Ct. App. 1990). This opinion has been certified for publication 
with the exception of parts III through XIII; the unpublished portion of the opinion 
illustrates the distinction between medical diagnosis of a serious mental disease and the 
legal definition of insanity. In Bobo, the court of appeal affirmed defendant's convictions 
of arson and first degree murder. Bobo stabbed her three children, immersed them in the 
bathtub and set fire to her apartment. The jury found that Bobo was sane during the 
commission of the crimes. The court held that no other mental state need be shown 
other than a deliberate intention unlawfully to kill. The court further held that once 
such an intention is proved in the context of an actual killing, the offense can be no less 
than murder unless the killing results from a sudden quarrel or heat of passion upon 
adequate provocation, or perhaps an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to de-
fend. See id. 
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 188, 189, 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). Section 192 
2
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of malice exists when an intentional homicide occurs.7 Malice is 
express when the defendant manifested a deliberate intention to 
unlawfully take the life of another human being. Malice is im-
plied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the 
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned or ma-
lignant heart.8 In order to mitigate murder to manslaughter, a 
defendant has the burden of raising a reasonable doubt in the 
minds of the jury as to the presence of malice. For full acquittal, 
a defendant has the burden of raising a reasonable doubt that 
such force was justified.9 
This comment uses the plight of Brenda Denise Aris to il-
lustrate the criminal defenses available to a battered woman 
who kills her aggressor. IO Since the 1989 decision in Aris, Cali-
fornia Governor Pete Wilson granted executive clemency to 
Aris.11 Governor Wilson reduced Aris' fifteen years to life sen-
tence to twelve years to life.12 Another significant event since the 
decision in Aris is the passage of California Assembly Bill 785 in 
1991. The Bill added Section 1107 to the California Evidence 
states in part, "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing without malice." Manslaughter is of 
three kinds: "1. voluntary - upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion provocation; 2. 
involuntary - in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony; or in the 
commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner; or 3. 
vehicular manslaughter:" [d. Section 188 provides: 
Such malice may be expressed or implied. It is expressed when 
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take 
away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no consid-
erable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attend-
ing the killing show an abandoned or malignant heart. When 
it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional doing 
of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no 
other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state 
of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness or an obligation 
to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor 
acting despite such awareness is included within the definition 
of malice. 
7. See Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756. 
8. See supra note 6. 
9. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN M. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(c) (2d ed. 
1986); see also People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1979) (recognizing the imperfect 
self-defense doctrine in California and declaring that the unreasonable belief rule should, 
henceforth, be considered a general principle for purposes of jury instructions). 
10. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 167. . 
11. California Governor Reduces Jail Terms of Two Battered Women, REUTERS, 
LIMITED, May 28, 1993. 
12. [d. 
3
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Code,I8 which permits expert testimony regarding battered wo-
man syndrome. The testimony may include expert opinion con-
cerning the physical, emotional, or mental effects of the bat-
tering upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of domestic 
violence victims. I4 The proponent of the evidence must only es-
tablish its relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert 
witness. 111 Despite these changes, the Aris decision provides an 
effective vehicle to demonstrate the obstacles confronting a bat-
tered woman when she enters the justice system. 
Brenda Aris killed her batterer, who was also her husband, 
while he slept. Ie The State of California prosecuted Aris for 
murder despite that on the night of the killing, Aris' husband 
had beaten her and had threatened to kill her when he awoke.I? 
Aris testified that during her ten year marriage her husband had 
beaten her, often severely, and that she had left him many 
times. I8 By a mixture of threats and cajoling, he invariably con-
vinced her to take him back.I9 Numerous witnesses for the de-
13. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993), which states: 
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by ei-
ther the prosecution or the defense regarding battered 
women's syndrome, including physical, emotional, or mental 
effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of 
domestic violence, except when offered against a criminal de-
fendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse 
which form the basis of the criminal charge. 
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this ex-
pert testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its 
relevancy and the proper qualifications of the expert witness. 
Expert opinion testimony on battered women's syndrome shall 
not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability 
is unproven. 
(c) For purposes of this section, "abuse" is defined in Section 
6203 of the Family Code and "domestic violence" is defined 
... in Section 6211 of the Family Code. 
(d) This section is intended as a rule of evidence only and no 
substantive change affecting the Penal Code is intended. 
See also Scott Gregory Baker, Deaf Justice?: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned 
Prior to the Enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 
(forthcoming Spring 1994) (advocating retroactive application of Evidence Code Section 
1107 as proposed in California Assembly Bill 2295). 
14. Id. § 1107(a). 
15. Id. § 1107(b). 
16. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171. 
17.Id. 
18.Id. 
19. Id. at 171. 
4
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fense testified to the beatings. Aris testified that on the night of 
the killing, her husband beat her and threatened that he did not 
think he was going to let her live until the morning.20 She be-
lieved he was "very serious."21 When Aris' husband fell asleep 
she went next door to get some ice to ease the pain the blows to 
her face had caused. There she found a handgun on top of the 
refrigerator and took it "for protection."22 Aris testified that this 
measure of protection was necessary because she felt her hus-
band would probably be awake and he would start hitting her 
again.2s Aris stated that when she returned to the bedroom, she 
then sat down on the bed and felt that she had to do it; she felt 
that when her husband awoke he would hurt her very badly or 
even kill her.24 Aris killed her husband by shooting him five 
times in the back while he slept.211 A jury convicted Aris of sec-
ond degree murder. She was sentenced to fifteen years to life in 
prison.26 
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction despite Aris' 
contentions that the trial court erred in: (1) excluding expert 
testimony that she was a battered woman and that it had af-
fected her mental condition at the time of the killing; (2) refus-
ing to instruct the jury on self-defense; (3) incorrectly in-
structing on "imminence" as part of the unreasonable self-
defense doctrine; (4) incorrectly instructing the jury about "heat 
of passion" and "cooling off"; and (5) excluding evidence of her 
husband's violent character.27 Essentially, the court of appeal af-
firmed a finding of retaliation rather than justified resistance. 
The jury found the presence of malice despite expert testi-
mony concerning battered woman's syndrome and Aris' testi-
mony involving her honest and actual belief in the need to de-
fend herself. The following comment focuses on the 
phenomenon of battered woman syndrome, and how the syn-








27. [d. Aris also asserted prosecutorial and juror misconduct as grounds for reversal. 
[d. 
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fenses that are available to a battered woman who kills her ag-
gressor. Finally, this comment proposes reform to criminal 
defense instructions which presently prevent battered women 
from asserting an effective defense. 
I. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
National estimates of the pervasiveness of domestic violence 
suggest that there are as many as four million incidents of do-
mestic violence against women each year.28 According to Federal 
Bureau of Investigation statistics, a woman is beaten every eigh-
teen seconds.29 The Surgeon General indicates that domestic vi-
olence is one of the leading causes of injury to women. so In fact, 
recent commentary suggests that more American women, 
whether rich or poor, are injured by the men in their lives than 
by car accidents, muggings and rape combined.sl Most women 
do not strike back. Of the 1.6 to 4 million women who are beaten 
each year, approximately 800 to 1000 will be charged with the 
murder of an abusive spouse or companion.s2 These figures indi-
cate that the frequency of deadly force, applied by millions of 
battered women, is minimal. 
The term "battered woman" describes a woman who is the 
victim of violence perpetrated by her partner and who remains 
in the relationship after repeated incidents of violence. ss The 
28. Note, Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1501 (1993) (citing Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1990) (testimony of Angela 
Browne, Ph.D.». 
29. Id. at 1501 (citing Donna Moore, Editor's Introduction: An Overview of the 
Problem, in BATTERED WOMAN 7, 14 (Donna Moore ed., 1979». 
30. Id. (citing Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health 
Service, 267 JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992) (noting that "a recent study found violence to be 
the 'leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 through 44 years' "). 
31. Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, January 18, 1993, at 38, 41 (discuss-
ing the prevalence of domestic violence and the lack of choices for battered women, as 
well as their extraordinary sensitivity to danger, and public and prosecutorial opposition 
to reform). 
32. Between .20% and .64% of battered women kill their abusive spouse or compan-
ion. See Erich D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the 
Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363, 366 (1992) (discussing, among other 
issues, the possible violations of the constitutional right to present a defense where a 
victim of domestic violence establishes a foundation for battered woman syndrome ex-
pert testimony, yet such testimony is excluded). 
33. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 920-21 (Ct. App. 1992). Day stabbed 
6
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term "battered woman syndrome" is a psychological doctrine 
that explains the victimization of women and how the process of 
victimization further entraps them. The result is a psychological 
paralysis to leave the relationship; the "rationale is the construct 
of learned helplessness. "34 
A. COMPONENTS OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
Battered women include wives or women in any form of an 
intimate relationship. In order to be classified as a battered wo-
man, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least 
twice. 311 If the woman remains in the relationship after the sec-
ond incident, she is defined as a battered woman.36 Repetitious 
violent behavior directed at the woman typically occurs in three 
distinct and continual stages which vary in duration and inten-
sity depending on the individuals involved.37 Phase one of the 
Brown, her boyfriend, in self-defense when he broke in the bathroom where she had 
barricaded herself after an evening of violence and threats. Brown opened the door and 
approached her with a knife. They fell to the floor and then to the bed. Day did not 
recall stabbing Brown so severely; so she fled assuming he would come after her. Day had 
never filed a formal complaint against Brown despite a history of severe physical abuse. 
Day even hesitated to phone the police after arriving at a girlfriend's house because the 
police had treated her badly in the past. Despite the fact that the killing occurred at the 
height of a battering incident, Day was prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter and found 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. The court of ap-
peal reversed on grounds that Day was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present evi-
dence of battered woman syndrome. The court noted that evidence of battered woman 
syndrome would have "bolstered appellant's credibility and lent credence to her self-
defense claim." [d.; see also Denise Bricker, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered 
Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony For Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive 
Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1993) (concerning the applicability of battered 
woman syndrome expert testimony for intimate violence for gay and lesbian victims of 
abuse). 
34. Lenore Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, in WOMEN AND 
THE LAW, 601-07 (Mary Joe Frug ed., 1992). See also Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 177 in which 
the court stated, "The battered' woman often does not know why she is beaten on any 
particular occasion. The violence is perceived by the woman 'as random and aversive 
stimulation.' Because of its randomness, she believes she is incapable of doing anything 
to prevent the abuse and, as a result, feels helpless." 
35. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 177. 
36. See id.; see also New Jersey v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984). Kelly fatally 
stabbed her husband with a pair of scissors. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed 
and remanded the reckless manslaughter conviction as it was error to exclude expert 
testimony on battered-woman syndrome. On remand, the trial court received an instruc-
tion to admit the testimony, if relevant to the honesty and reasonableness of Kelly's 
belief that deadly force was necessary to protect her against death or serious bodily 
injury. 
37. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176; see also Kelly, 478 A.2d at 370-72 (discussing Dr. 
7
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battering cycle is referred to as the tension-building stage. Dur-
ing this stage the battering male engages in minor battering inci-
dents and verbal abuse while the woman attempts to be as pla-
cating and passive as possible in order to stave off more serious 
violence.88 
Phase two is the most violent point of the cycle.89 In this 
acute phase, the violence seems to last somewhere between a few 
hours to possibly twenty-four to forty-eight hours.4o Battered 
women often describe the violent incidents during this phase as 
random. It is not uncommon for the batterer to wake a woman 
from a deep sleep to begin the assault.41 
Phase three of the battering cycle is characterized by ex-
treme contrition and loving behavior on the part of the battering 
male.41l The man will often "mix his pleas for forgiveness and 
protestations of devotion with promises to seek professional 
help."48 The period of relative calm may last as long as several 
months." However, in some cases phase three is so short that it 
may not be noticeable. The tension may quickly start to build 
again and the cycle begins anew. 411 
The cyclical nature of the battering may explain why a bat-
tered woman simply does not leave her abuser.46 The batterer's 
loving behavior towards his mate during phase three may con-
vince her that her mate will change. This may keep her bound to 
Lenore Walker's book THE BATJ'ERED WOMAN). 
38. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371. 
39. See Lenore E. Walker, How Battering Happens and How to Stop It, in BAT-
TERED WOMEN 68-69 (1979); see also Gina Boubion, Women Who Killed Their Mates 
Seeking Clemency in California, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 8 1992, where the au-
thor discusses the plight of Brenda Clubine. At the time Clubine killed her abusive hus-
band, he was wanted on a charge of felony battery for rubbing his wife's face so hard on 
the carpet that her skin came off. She weighed 88 pounds to his 260. In the previous six 
years, he broke her ribs and fractured her skull repeatedly. She suffers from mild brain 
damage which may have been caused by repeated beatings. 
40. See Walker, supra note 39, at 68-69. 
41. Id. 
42.Id. 
43. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371. 
44.Id. 
45. See Walker, supra note 39, at 71; see also Andersen, supra note 32, at 370 (not-
ing that as cycles recur within the abusive relationship, the violence escalates in severity 
and acute beatings occur more frequently). 
46. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/5
1994] NEW PATTERNED DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 139 
the relationship!' The woman's response to her situation varies 
from silence and denial to demoralization and degradation so se-
vere that a psychological paralysis results.·8 
While the above three-stage normative model may accu-
rately describe the battering cycle occurring in the lives of many 
battered women, proponents of reform in self-defense jurispru-
dence have expressed concern over strict adherence to such a 
model!e Strict adherence to a proto-typical, distinctive stage 
model may preclude testimony of battered woman syndrome. A 
trial judge may refuse to admit evidence of domestic violence 
because the pattern of abuse does not precisely fit into the three 
stages.IIO Accordingly, this comment suggests that the three 
phase model should not be relied on to establish the relevancy 
for battered woman syndrome expert testimony at trial. Instead, 
it should emphasize that (1) a battering incident has occurred 
more than once and (2) the woman remained in the situation. 
The broader offer of proof will not bring about meritless claims. 
The justice system has previously recognized the basic two-part 
definition suggested above as the basis for classifying a victim of 
domestic violence as a battered woman. III 
B. LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
1. Learned Helplessness 
Learned Helplessness theory comprises the second compo-
nent of battered woman syndrome. Based on social learning and 
47. Id.; see also People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1992). Day testi-
fied that Brown, her mate, began beating her early in their relationship. Day loved 
Brown despite his violent behavior. She attributed the beatings to his alcohol problem 
and believed if she stayed with him and they worked together, their relationship would 
improve. However, Brown's violence against Day increased with time in both frequency 
and duration. Id. 
48. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372. 
49. See Panel Discussion, Courtroom, Code and Clemency: Reform in Self-Defense 
Jurisprudence for Battered Women, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 829, 833 (i993). Attor-
ney Rebecca Isaacs expressed concern over the propriety of strict adherence to a norma-
tive model. Isaacs suggests that "expert testimony should include a broad conception of 
battering in society, including the obstacles faced in leaving a relationship, social and 
cultural factors, the dynamics of abuse, as well as the specific experiences of the woman 
on trial." These issues were a few of the topics raised in a discussion of the problems 
with laws regarding battered woman syndrome admissibility. Id. 
50.Id. 
51. See, e.g., Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176. 
9
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cognitive and motivational theoretical principles, the theory ex-
plains the psychological paralysis that maintains the victim sta-
tus of a battered woman.1I2 Martin Seligman developed the 
learned helplessness theory during an experiment in which dogs 
received repetitious, unavoidable shocks. liS After repeated 
shocks, the dogs failed to attempt to es~ape the shock.1I4 The 
principle of learned helplessness has been shown to apply 
equally to humans. 1I11 
The first phase within the theory of learned helplessness, as 
applied to victims of domestic violence, occurs when continuous 
aversive events cause battered women to feel powerless. The 
powerlessness over the violence creates a .belief that control is 
not possible. liS Battered women do not attempt to gain freedom 
from a battering relationship because they do not believe they 
can escape the domination. They learn that their voluntary re-
sponses have no effect on the consequences in their lives.1I7 
2. External Social and Economic Factors 
The feeling of powerlessness to escape the repetitious vio-
lence is also reinforced by social stereotypes. lIB A "happy family" 
stereotype promotes isolation from friends and family so others 
52. See Walker, supra note 34, at 601-04 (discussing the basic components of the 
learned helplessness theory, the applicability of the theory on the human species, bat-
tered women's pervasive belief of powerlessness and the belief that they are helpless to 
control violence administered against them). 
53. PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO. PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 246 (1985) (discussing the work of 
Martin Seligman on Operant Conditioning: Learning About Consequence and Unusual 
Contingencies). 
54. Id. In the original study, different groups of dogs wimt through a two-phase ex-
periment. In Phase One, they received painful, unavoidable shocks which some dogs 
could escape by learning to press a switch. The others continued to receive the shock no 
matter what they did. In Phase two, the dogs were put into a different apparatus, in 
which escape was possible simply by jumping over a small hurdle. A tone (conditioned 
stimulus) signaled that the shocks were about to start. The subjects that had learned to 
escape in the earlier situation quickly learned the new response, but the others rarely did 
so. Instead, they just crouched, passively getting shocked. This general response follow-
ing non-contingent, inescapable shocks was termed "learned helplessness". [d. 
55. [d. 
56. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 177. 
57. See Walker, supra note 34, at 604-05. 
58. Book Note, Generalizing Justice Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women Kill 
and How Society Responds, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1384, 1386 (1990) (discussing biases em-
bedded in the legal standards and arguing that misconceptions about violent relation-
ships distort jurors' attitudes about battered women's experiences). 
10
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never discover how profoundly violent the woman's life actually 
is.1I9 Some battered women lie so frequently that they confuse 
their own reality; they make excuses for their men and assume 
self-blame. Sometimes women do not leave their batterers be-
cause they grow up in cultures that are so immersed in violence 
that they fail to comprehend that there are alternative, non-vio-
lent places to gO.60 Despite academic and career independence, 
when it comes to relationships with men, many battered woman 
resort to traditional stereotyped behavior. Moreover, when chil-
dren are involved, the stigma that attaches to a woman who 
leaves such a family unit may keep her from leaving.61 
Women who want to leave their abusive mates may have 
difficulty because of a lack of material resources.62 Women often 
earn less money63 and have more responsibility in taking care of 
the household and children. Although a typical first reaction to a 
confrontation with violence may be to fiee, a battered woman 
often realizes that she has no place to gO.64 
When victims of domestic violence endure unprovoked repe-
titious violence, which is coupled with social pressures and ex-
pectations, severe emotional and motivational deficits result. 
Battered women typically do not accept assistance because they 
believe it will not be effective. They see their batterers as all 
powerful and themselves as powerless. Consequently, they see no 
safety for themselves. Viewing a domestic violence victim's be-
havior in this light provides a rationale why women remain in a 
59. See Walker, supra note 34, at 604-05. 
60. See Gibbs, supra note 31, at 42-43 (discussing the absence of options for the 
battered woman, which is evident by conditions such as: 1) the fact that New York has 
about 1300 beds for a state with 18 million people, and 2) that in 1990, the Baltimore zoo 
spent twice as much to care for animals as the state spent on shelters for victims of 
domestic violence). 
61. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372-73. 
62. [d. 
63. See e.g., Janet Holmgren McKay, Don't Equate Mills With the Citadel as Sin-
gle Sex College, S.F. EXAM., Mar. 13, 1994, at A18. The President of Mills College com-
ments that despite that women are now a slight majority in college classrooms, the 1990 
census data shows that female college graduates have lifetime earnings equal to the earn-
ings of male high school graduates. See also Beverly Medlyn, Pay Disparity Rated Top 
Worry at Women's Business Gathering, ARIZONA BUSINESS GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 1994 at 6 
("Women earn 76 percent of men's median pay, even though the equal-pay law has been 
in effect for 30 years," said Rebecca Winterscheidt, a Phoenix lawyer who spoke on em-
ployment law to the 1994 Governor's Conference on Women and Business.). 
64. [d. 
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violent relationship or return to a dangerous relationship once 
they have empowered themselves to leave. A logical result of 
repetitious violence is that battered women perceive harm in a 
different light than people who have not endured continuous vi-
olence and demoralization. 
II. LEGAL DEFENSES AND BATTERED WOMAN'S 
SYNDROME 
Brenda Aris testified that on the night that she killed her 
husband, she was sure she would not live until morning. On the 
night which might have proved most dangerous to her life, Aris 
found the means to defend herself. Although Aris suffered ten 
years of victimization, the jury found her actions to be retalia-
tory rather than defensive. 811 
Our legal system assigns to the jury the duty of applying the 
defenses raised by the battered woman who kills.88 With the ad-
dition of Evidence Code section 1107,87 the jury will, henceforth, 
receive expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome 
when the defense establishes its relevance. Consequently, many 
of the issues discussed above may now be considered when the 
jury deliberates on the criminal defenses raised at trial. Not-
withstanding the permissibility of expert testimony under sec-
tion 1107, the battered woman on trial for an intentional killing 
will confront obstacles under the present criminal defense 
instructions. 
III. THE EFFECT OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, 
THE PRESENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE DOCTRINES 
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Justice demands defense doctrines which consider the defi-
65. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76. 
66. CAL. EVID. CODE § 312 (West 1992): 
Jury as trier of fact - Except as otherwise provided by law, 
where the trial is by jury: (a) All questions of fact are to be 
decided by the jury; (b) Subject to the control of the court, the 
jury is to determine the effect and value of the evidence ad-
dressed to it, including the credibility of witnesses and hearsay 
declarants. 
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
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cits of learned helplessness, battered woman's syndrome, and 
the constructs of social stereotyping. The woman who kills her 
batterer will not receive a fair trial if the defense doctrines do 
not consider her perceptions in their totality. Women and men 
may respond to situations in different manners. A man's reac-
tion to a situation may be unjustifiable. The same reaction on 
the part of a woman may be justifiable resistance, not mere re-
taliation.s8 The jury disregards a battered woman's lower degree 
of culpability when it fails to consider the facts in their totality, 
including the gender differences and the harmful consequences 
of battered woman syndrome. Therefore, it is imperative that 
legal doctrines accommodate the perceptions of fear at the mo-
ment in time when a battered woman staves off one more 
beating. 
In light of the criminal defense doctrines presently availa-
ble, a battered woman would be best advised to premeditate the 
fatal act. That is, by planning to have a weapon accessible dur-
ing a future assault, the woman's perfect self-defense strategy 
for complete exoneration will more readily correspond to the 
present aggressor situation in which men often find themselves. 
Undoubtedly, modern jurisprudence does not intend to en-
courage premeditation, however, the criminal justice system's 
non-empathetic treatment of the battered woman's perceptions 
of danger renders premeditation necessary to justify the use of 
force. 
Amendments to the justification doctrine of perfect self-de-
fense must acknowledge the lower degree of culpability of a bat-
tered woman who kills. Courts would not abuse their duty to 
society by going so far as to adopt an instruction of a "reasona-
68. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REv. 
703, 718 (1982) (reviewing ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL (1980». The overall thesis of 
Jones's book is that: 
[d. 
[L)aw, made by men, for men, and amassed down through his-
tory on their behalf, codifies masculine bias and systematically 
discriminates against women by ignoring the woman's point of 
view. Today the law is still largely enforced ... by men; so it 
still works in the interests of men as a group ... [T)he result 
for women is the same: they are deprived at every step of 
equal protection under the law; and even those women who 
receive fair and equal treatment are likely to be thought of as 
having gotten away with something. 
13
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ble battered woman standard" when applying the reasonable re-
quirement of self-defense. Neither a reasonable man standard, 
nor even a reasonable person standard can adequately contem-
plate the plight of the battered woman. Although Aris suffered 
ten years of abuse, her mental state and perceptual abilities 
were simply disregarded under a reasonable, non-battered indi-
vidual standard. It would not be special treatment to apply a 
battered woman standard that acknowledges the gender and sit-
uational differences of a battered woman. Instead, by broaden-
ing the standard for reasonableness, the courts would recognize 
the totality of the facts. The viewpoint that battered women 
must "look to ... restraining orders [and] shelters ... " is not 
viable in light of the learned helplessness theory.69 Battered 
women feel powerless against their mates; they will often be 
manipulated or threatened into abandoning their steps of em-
powerment. Attention to the battered woman's right to gender-
equal treatment of the laws must become a legislative and judi-
cial priority. 
In addition to amending justification doctrines, such as per-
fect self-defense, it is equally necessary to modify the defense 
instructions to mitigate murder to manslaughter. By broadening 
the scope of provocation to include anything that provides a rea-
sonable explanation for extreme emotional disturbance, the mit-
igation defense would thereafter consider the battered woman's 
plight. Additionally, by allowing the jury to consider the bat-
tered woman's experiences when evaluating the cooling off pe-
riod, the battered woman's emotional trauma and subsequent 
defensive acts will not be seen as retaliatory. Instead the acts 
may be found to be a justifiable response to the fear induced by 
her mate's aggression and threats. 
Application of the other mitigation tool of an honest, but 
unreasonable belief (the imperfect self-defense doctrine) equally 
requires amendment. One option is to allow the jury to consider 
the sorts of external and internal forces which might make a rea-
sonable person more likely to fail to satisfy the reasonable ele-
ment of self-defense. Consideration of these forces would lend 
credence to the battered woman's honest belief. This modifica'-
tion would render the imperfect self-defense doctrine an effec-
69. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 174. 
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tive mitigation tool for women like Aris. 
The following discussion explores the present legal defenses 
available when an intentional killing occurs. The killing will be 
classified as murder unless the battered woman either negates 
malice or obtains an acquittal through the doctrines of justifica-
tion or excuse. Some of these defense instructions were re-
quested in the Aris case and subsequently denied. 
A. JUSTIFICATION THROUGH PERFECT SELF-DEFENSE 
Whenever justification exists, malice is ameliorated and the 
defendant is not guilty of any crime. A homicide may be justi-
fied if committed in self-defense. Most states render acts of self-
defense lawful when used to resist offenses capable of injury 
against one's person or family. The amount of resistive force 
must be commensurate with the degree of force applied by an 
assailant. The typical standard for complete exoneration is that 
force which is reasonably necessary to prevent imminent in-
jury.70 The use of deadly force is not justifiable unless the actor 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect her-
self against imminent death or serious bodily injury.71 While the 
existence of actual necessity is not required, a valid plea of self-
defense does have a two-fold requirement. First, the law requires 
an actual or honest belief on the part of the defendant in the 
necessity of using force. An honest belief alone does not suffice 
for complete exoneration under the perfect self-defense doctrine. 
A defendant must also establish the reasonableness of her belief 
in the necessity to use deadly force.72 
Determining whether a defendant's belief in the necessity to 
use deadly force was reasonable does not call for an evaluation 
of the defendant's subjective state of mind. Instead, California 
law requires an objective evaluation of the defendant's assert-
edly defensive acts.73 The judicial system phrases the standard 
for perfect self-defense in the objective terms of whether a rea-
sonable person, as opposed to the defendant, would have be-
70. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692·693 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
71. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9, § 5.7(c). 
72. [d. 
73. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
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lieved and acted as the defendant did.74 
The court of appeal in Aris held that "expert testimony 
about a defendant's state of mind is not relevant to the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's self-defense."711 The Aris holding is 
significantly different from the court of appeal decision three 
years later in People v. Day.78 Even though Day killed her bat-
terer in the height of a battering incident and had endured 
many years of severe violence, the prosecution charged her with 
voluntary manslaughter.77 The jury convicted Day of involun-
tary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon. The court 
of appeal reversed on grounds that Day was prejudiced by coun-
sel's failure to present evidence of battered woman syndrome.78 
The court noted that evidence of battered woman syndrome 
would have "bolstered appellant's credibility and lent credence 
to her self-defense claim."79 The court stated that "because 
counsel was unaware of the battered woman syndrome he was 
unable effectively to counter the prosecutor's contention that 
[Day's] conduct was inconsistent with self-defense."8o 
Notably, the California judiciary maintains incompatible 
opinions concerning the utility of battered woman syndrome tes-
timony. The fact that the California legislature added Evidence 
Code section 1107 in 1991 may have had an impact on the diver-
gent opinions of Aris and Day. Section 1107 permits expert tes-
timony about battered woman syndrome to explain how the bat-
tered woman's particular experiences affect her perceptions of 
danger and her honest belief in the imminent need to defend 
herself from that danger.81 Despite the addition of this statute, 
when a woman kills her batterer and pleads perfect self-defense, 
74.Id. 
75.Id. 
76. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 916 (Ct. App. 1992); see supra note 33. 
77. Id. at 917. 
78. Id. at 924-25. 
79.Id. 
80.Id. 
81. See People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 333-35 (Ct. App. 1992). Debra and 
Terrance Romero were both charged with one count of second degree robbery and four 
counts of attempted robbery. Debra claimed a duress defense. She admitted the crimes 
but claimed she participated because she was afraid Terrance would kill her if she did 
not do as he demanded. The court of appeal agreed with Romero's claim that her lawyer 
was ineffective because he failed to present expert testimony explaining battered woman 
syndrome. 
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she still must establish the reasonableness component of that 
doctrine. 
In People v. Romero, the court of appeal agreed that it was 
error to exclude expert testimony concerning battered woman 
syndrome in order to substantiate Romero's duress defense.8l1 
This 1992 opinion recognized that although Romero was tried in 
1990 and Evidence Code section 1107 was added in 1991, there 
is apparently no legislative prohibition to retroactive application 
of that section.88 The court extended the use of section 1107, 
stating that the duress defense is the same as self-defense since 
in both "the key issue is whether the defendant reasonably and 
honestly believed she was in imminent danger of great bodily 
harm or death."M At the present time, there are no published 
opinions applying section 1107 to a battered woman's perfect 
self-defense claim. Without express language in section 1107 
which authorizes the court to consider battered woman syn-
drome testimony when the court considers the "reasonable" ele-
ment of perfect self-defense, battered women have no assurance 
of self-defense reform. If future opinions follow the court's rea-
soning in Aris, in cases where the battered woman maintains an 
honest belief in the need to kill in self-defense, the court's fail-
ure to permit the jury to consider the reasonableness of the wo-
man's action as a battered woman will cause the perfect self-
defense claim to fail. An honest belief alone is insufficient to 
constitute complete justification for acts of resistance.811 
As a general rule, a court must provide a requested defense 
instruction if there is substantial evidence to support the de-
fense asserted.86 On appeal, Aris argued that the trial court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense. The 
court disagreed and stated that "[g]iven the definition of immi-
nent danger in California Law. . . there was no evidence of any 
reasonable indication in the sleeping victim's behavior that he 
was about to attempt to harm the defendant."87 The court con-
82.Id. 
83. See id.; but see Scott Gregory Baker, supra note 13. 
84. Id. at 1160 (emphasis added). 
85. See, e.g., Donald L. Creach, Partially Determined Imperfect Self Defense: The 
Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615, 629-31 (1982). 
86. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176 (citing Flannel, 603 P.2d I, 10 (Cal. 1979». 
87. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176. 
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cluded that the requisite imminent danger to Aris' life was not 
apparent from the facts because there was no substantial evi-
dence that a reasonable person under the same circumstances 
would have perceived an immediate danger manifesting a need 
to kill in self-defense.88 The court stated, "no 'jury composed of 
reasonable men could have concluded that' a sleeping victim 
presents an imminent danger of great bodily harm, especially 
when the defendant was able to, and actually did, leave the bed-
room, and subsequently returned to shoot him."89 
If a court refuses to instruct on perfect self-defense because 
"reasonable men" would not believe that an imminent danger 
was present, then battered woman syndrome testimony per sec-
tion 1107 is ineffective. Instead, when a defendant raises a per-
fect self-defense claim, jury instructions must assist in explain-
ing the battered woman's perception of imminent danger. 
Absent reform, future judges may exclude a perfect self-defense 
instruction where the raw facts at the time of the killing fall 
short of the substantial evidence standard required to support 
an instruction. The outcome of the Aris case supports the infer-
ence that in spite of Dr. Walker's testimony, the court disre-
garded the evidence of battered woman syndrome. The court fo-
cused solely on the fact that Aris' husband slept at the time Aris 
fired the fatal shot. 
Additionally, despite the modern trend for courts to imple-
ment a reasonable "person" standard, rather than the reasona-
ble man standard, such instruction may nonetheless violate a 
battered woman's right to equal protection.90 In Washington v. 
Wanrow, the court held that use of male pronouns in the self-
defense instruction violated the female defendant's right to 
equal protection of the law.91 The court stated that the defend-
88. 1d. at 181. 
89. 1d. at 176 (emphasis added). 
90. See Naomi R. CBhn, The Looseness 01 Legal Language: The Reasonable Wo-
man Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1414-16 (1992) (ar-
guing that despite its many benefits, the reB80nable woman standard is problematic). 
"[T]he reB80nable woman standard is reminiscent of earlier dominant images of white 
middle clB8s women ... [which] depicted women B8 pure, chB8te, virtuous, and altruis-
tic .... [T]he reB80nable woman standard establishes certain expectations for women 
that are different than those for men ... [and] does not accommodate the experiences 
of all women." 1d. 
91. WB8hington v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 550-51, 558-59 (WB8h. 1977). The WB8h-
ington Supreme Court reversed Wanrow's second degree murder conviction in a decision 
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ant was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in light of 
her own perceptions of the situation.92 Failure to recognize how 
a woman's status may affect her perception of danger denies a 
woman "a trial by the same rules which are applicable to male 
defendants."9s The error was coinpounded by utilizing language 
suggesting that the defendant's conduct must be measured 
against that of a reasonable male finding himself in the same 
circumstances. By refuting the use of a reasonable man stan-
dard, and instead, positing the necessity to consider the defend-
ant's own perceptions, the court sanctions a subjective standard 
when the jury applies the "reasonable" requirement of the per-
fect self-defense doctrine. 
Although the jury instructions provided in the Aris case 
were gender neutral, the jury did not consider Aris' actions in 
light of her perceptions of the situation.9• Instead, the court ap-
plied the identical defense doctrines which would be applied in a 
situation where a male engaged in a brawl with a total stranger. 
Since Aris did not kill a stranger and she suffered from battered 
woman syndrome, it was inappropriate to solely examine the raw 
facts when the judge decided against a self-defense instruction. 
Other jurisdictions have reduced the defense burden when a 
battered woman kills through modified applications of self-de-
fense doctrines. For example, a North Dakota court adopted a 
subjective standard of reasonableness. In State u. Leidholm, the 
court required the jury to find only that, from the defendant's 
point of view, she honestly and reasonably believed she was in 
imminent danger of great bodily harm or death.911 
CALJIC 5.12 provides the jury with an instruction for justi-
fiable homicide in self-defense. Since the perfect self-defense in-
which held that the use of a reasonable man objective standard of self-defense violated 
Wanrow's right to equal protection of the laws. Wanrow shot an intoxicated, unarmed 
man whom she knew had a reputation for violence when he approached her in a threat-
ening manner. At the time of the killing, Wanrow was 5'4" tall, had a broken leg and was 
using a crutch. The Court held that the use of the reasonable man standard in the jury 
instructions was improper because it deprived Wanrow of the right to have the jury con-
sider her conduct in light of her fear and perceptions of danger as affected by her status 
as a woman. [d. 
92. [d. at 559. 
93. [d. 
94. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176. 
95. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983). 
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struction is the battered woman's only chance for acquittal, it 
must contemplate her perceptions at the time of the defensive 
act. 
1. Present Instruction per CALJIC 5.12 
CALJIC 5.12 states: 
The killing of another person in self-defense is 
justifiable and not unlawful when the person who 
does the killing honestly and reasonably believes: 
1. That there is imminent danger that the other 
person will kill [him] [her] or cause [him] [her] 
great bodily injury; and 2. That it was necessary 
under the circumstances to kill the other person 
to prevent death or great bodily injury to [him-
self] [herself]. In order to justify killing another 
person in self-defense, actual danger or great bod-
ily injury is not necessary. On the other hand, a 
mere fear of death or great bodily injury is not 
sufficient.98 
2. CALJIC 5.12 Revised 97 
"The killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable 
and not unlawful when the person who does the killing honestly 
and reasonably believes: 1. That there is imminent danger that 
the other person will kill [him) [her) or cause [him) [her) great 
bodily injury; and 2. That it was necessary under the circum-
stances to kill the other person to prevent death or great bodily 
injury to [himself) [herself). 
In order for the defendant to harbor an honest belief in the 
necessity to defend against imminent peril, it is essential that 
an aggressor presently threatens or previously threatened 
force. Where the defendant, at the time the fatal act occurred, 
harbored an honest, actual and genuine perception of the need 
to repel imminent peril, such defendant does not harbor mal-
ice. Relevant to the honesty of the defendant's belief are the 
internal and external forces existing in the defendant'S life 
96. CALlIC 5.12. Vol. 1 (1988 and Supp. 1993). 
97. The italicized portion indicates proposed revisions to the instruction. 
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which lend credence to the genuine need for subsequent defen-
sive conduct against the present victim. 
The reasonable belief requirement for the killing of an-
other person in self-defense requires consideration of the de-
fendant's perceptions of the situation and the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the killing. The totality of the cir-
cumstances' analysis considers whether a reasonable person, 
similarly situated under the very same facts and circum-
stances, would perceive that it was necessary to kill to prevent 
death or great bodily injury to [himself] [herself]. Considera-
tion of the very same circumstances requires evaluation of the 
testimony offered concerning the defendant's perceptions at 
the time of the fatal act. The circumstances to be considered 
include those which preceded the killing if the person claiming 
justifiable homicide demonstrates that earlier incidents di-
rectly contributed to the perception of imminent danger. Ac-
tual danger or great bodily injury is not necessary." 
3. Significance of the Revisions to CALJIC 5.12 
By allowing the jury to consider the internal as well as the 
external forces which factor into the person who kills' honest 
and actual belief of the present need to repel danger, a battered 
woman's heightened perception of a threat will not be disre-
garded. The revised application of the reasonableness require-
ment permits the jury to consider a subjective standard while 
retaining the reasonable objective standard. The instruction lib-
erally considers the person who kills' perceptions of danger only 
when that person can demonstrate that a direct and reasonable 
correlation exists between the circumstances preceding the 
death and the belief of the need to use deadly force. 
B. NEGATING MALICE TO REDUCE MURDER TO MANSLAUGHTER 
In California, as elsewhere, the penalty for manslaughter is 
significantly less than that for murder. First degree murder is 
punishable by a term of twenty-five years to life, and second de-
gree murder, where there is no showing of premeditation or de-
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liberation, results in confinement for fifteen years to life.98 In 
turn, voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment for 
three, six or eleven years, and involuntary manslaughter is pun-
ishable by confinement for two, three or four years.99 If a bat-
tered woman is precluded from asserting a perfect self-defense 
argument, then an alternative defense strategy would be to con-
tend that despite the intentional act, she did not harbor malice. 
1. Legislative Opposition to Negating Malice 
Presently under California law, reform to the mitigation 
doctrines faces a major, although not insurmountable, legislative 
obstacle. In 1981, the California legislature amended Penal Code 
sections 28, 29, 188, and 189 through Senate Bill No. 54.100 The 
legal consequences of those amendments are that express malice 
and intent to unlawfully kill are now one and the same, and the 
California judicial system has abolished the partially excused de-
fenses of diminished capacity defense and insanity.101 
Prior to the amendments, Penal Code sections 28 and 29 
permitted murder to be reduced to manslaughter, not only on 
the statutory basis of the reasonable person objective standard 
of provocation,t°2 but also on the subjective standard of defend-
ant's voluntary intoxication or mental impairment. lOS Penal 
Code section 28, as modified, provides in pertinent part that evi-
dence of mental illness "shall not be admitted ... to negate ca-
pacity to form any mental state . . . but is admissible solely on 
the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a re-
quired specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored 
malice aforethought when a specific intent crime is charged."104 
A provision abolishing the defense of diminished capacity 
was also included in the initiative measure adopted in June 1982 
known as Proposition 8. Proposition 8 added Section 25 to the 
98. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
99. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
100. S. 54, Regular Session (1981-1982); see People v. Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 
758-59 (Ct. App. 1990) see supra note 5; see also People v. SailIe, 820 P.2d 588, 592-93 
(Cal. 1991). 
101. Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59, see supra note 5. 
102. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
103. See Saille, 820 P.2d at 592-93. 
104. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
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California Penal Code. That section provides: "The defense of 
diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action 
. . . evidence concerning an accused person's intoxication, 
trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible 
to show or negate capacity to form the ... intent, motive, malice 
aforethought . . . or other mental state required for the commis-
sion of the crime charged. "1011 
Penal Code section 188 now provides: "When it is shown 
that the killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act 
with express or implied malice . . . no other mental state need 
be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. 
Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general 
body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such aware-
ness is included within the definition of malice."106 Thus, once 
an intentional killing is shown, malice aforethought is 
established. 
The Legislature's narrowing of the definition of express 
malice and the resulting restriction on the scope of voluntary 
manslaughter through amendments to sections 25, 28, and 29, 
curtails the use of mens rea defenses.107 
In People v. Saille, the defendant argued that these amend-
ments present a due process problem. lOB The Supreme Court 
disagreed; instead, it stated that "the Legislature can limit the 
mental elements included in the statutory definition of a 
crime. moe The court further held that "[i]n amending section 
188 in 1981, the Legislature equated express malice with an in-
tent unlawfully to kill. Since two distinct concepts no longer ex-
ist, there has been some narrowing of the mental element in-
cluded in the statutory definition of express malice. "110 
However, the court noted that sections 28 and 29 still permit 
expert testimony to show that because of mental illness or vol-
untary intoxication, the defendant did not actually form the in-
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. 
107. Mens rea is Latin for a guilty state of mind. It defines the mental states accom-
panying a forbidden act: (1) intent; (2) knowledge; (3) recklessness; or (4) gross (crimi-
nal) negligence. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990). 
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tent to unlawfully kill.1ll A defendant still may negate malice 
which would in turn render the only supportable verdict to be 
involuntary manslaughter or acquittal. 111 
2. Survival of the Other Mitigation Tools 
The court, in People v.· Bobo, expressly held that the only 
statutory mitigation tool that survived the 1981 legislation is 
codified in Penal Code section 192.118 Section 192 proposes that 
malice is presumed to be absent from a killing resulting from 
sudden quarrel or heat of passion upon sufficient provocation.ll4 
In Bobo, the court stated that "perhaps" voluntary manslaugh-
ter still encompasses the imperfect self-defense doctrine deline-
ated in the 1979 Flannel decision. llli The court further noted 
that because the imperfect self-defense doctrine did not apply to 
the case at hand, it would not decide whether Proposition 8 and 
the 1981 legislation abrogated the Flannel concept.U8 
Although the defense of heat of passion or provocation sur-
vived the legislative amendments, suggested reform to this miti-
gation doctrine in order to simplify its application will likely en-
counter strong legislative opposition. Additionally, reform to the 
present, yet tenuous, non-statutory imperfect self-defense doc-
trine, which might allow jurors to better empathize with the 
plight of the battered woman who kills, stands to encounter even 
greater opposition. 
C. STATUTORY VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER: HEAT OF PASSION 
AND PROVOCATION 
Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a 
human in which malice is lacking because the fatal act occurred 
under circumstances of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, oth-
erwise known as adequate provocation. ll7 To reduce a murder 
1l1. 1d. 
1l2. 1d. 
1l3. See People v. Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (Ct. App. 1990) see supra note 5. 
1l4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988). 
1l5. See Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760; see also People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 
1979). 
1l6. Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760, see supra note 5. 
1l7. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9, § 7.10(a·b). 
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charge to manslaughter upon the ground of adequate provoca-
tion the defendant must satisfy two requirements: "[T]he provo-
cation must be of such character and degree as naturally would 
excite and arouse such passion and the assailant must act under 
the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion."l18 
The first element requires the presence of such passion "as 
would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasona-
ble person ... of average disposition to act rationally and with-
out deliberation and reflection and from such passion rather 
than from judgment."u9 
The second requirement, which is paramount to the efficacy 
of this defense, is that the defendant must act out of fear. This 
defense largely requires that after" 'heat of passion' was reason-
ably and justifiedly engendered, 'hot blood had not had time to 
cool. . . .' "120 A court will not allow a homicide defendant to 
succeed under a claim of heat of passion/provocation when the 
use of force followed a "cooling off" pefiod. l21 
In Aris, the court found that her fear "must have subsided 
somewhat after the assault and threats ended."121 The court dis-
regarded Aris' contention that because her "passion" was 
aroused by a series of events over a considerable period of time, 
it could not be subject to a standard "cooling off" period. The 
court focused on the fact that Aris' husband was sleeping and 
commented that: "A reasonable inference from the facts is that 
the defendant experienced a peak of fear while she was beaten 
and threatened which must have subsided somewhat after the 
assault and threats ended. "123 The general testimony concerning 
battered woman syndrome did not a,ssist her in a heat of passion 
defense. The court did not want to burden the jury further by 
requiring them to consider additional emotions in a case of vol-
untary manslaughter through heat of passion.124 Essentially, the 
court rationalized its indifference to the plight of the battered 
118. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (emphasis added). 
119. [d. 
120. People v. Cooley, 27 Cal. Rptr. 543, 555 (Ct. App. 1962). 
121. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 183. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. 
124. [d. at 1202-03. 
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woman through an argument of judicial efficiency. 
Modern voluntary manslaughter doctrine in the United 
States is the successor to sixteenth and seventeenth century En-
glish common law.1811 The commonplace wearing of weapons 
turned drunken brawls into deadly affairs.186 The subsequent 
difficulties in proving self-defense, and the fact that capital pun-
ishment was an unfair result for those who killed in mutual com-
bat, prompted jurists to mitigate the crime of murder to man-
slaughter if the defendant was shown to have acted in the heat 
of passion. U7 Present defense doctrines, which are derived from 
the common law, contemplate the sudden, male, barroom-brawl 
situation, and in turn, fail to consider some of the scenarios 
which exist when battered women kill their aggressors. 
The four elements of this common law defense still influ-
ence modern voluntary manslaughter doctrine: (1) a provocation 
that would arouse a reasonable manUS to the heat of passion; (2) 
the defendant was actually aroused to the heat of passion; (3) a 
reasonable man129 would not have cooled off; and (4) the defend-
ant did not, in fact, cool Off.130 
The "reasonable" components in criminal defense doctrines 
are often very problematic. In Donna A. Coker's article, Heat of 
Passion and Wife Killing, she considers the proposition that as 
provocation must be such that a "reasonable" person would also 
have been swayed by such passion, what does reasonableness 
mean when "reasonable" people are never moved so entirely by 
provocation to kill?181 Coker explores the work of Joshua 
Dressler, who upon contemplating this question, suggested that 
voluntary manslaughter applies to those killings committed 
125. Donna A. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men 
Who Kill, 2 REv. OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 79 (1992) (discussing the historical 
irony concerning heat of passion killing. Males justify their violence on the grounds that 




128. See CALlIC 8.42 which defines Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion and Provo-
cation using "an ordinarily reasonable person" standard. 
129. See CALJIC 8.43 which interprets the Cooling-Off Period according to "the 
average or ordinarily reasonable person." 
130. See Coker, supra note 125, at 79. 
131. [d. at 99-101. 
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under provocation that would cause the "ordinarily law-abiding 
person to lose self-control."132 Dressler's words "ordinarily law-
abiding person" contemplate the key boundary which might 
render reform to the provocation definition to be perceived fa-
vorably by the California legislature. The California Penal Code 
currently defines voluntary manslaughter in section 192: 
Every person who unlawfully kills another human 
being without malice aforethought but with an in-
tent to kill, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in 
violation of Section 192 of the Penal Code. ISS 
No malice aforethought exists if the killing oc-
curred [upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion] 
[or] [in the honest but unreasonable belief in the 
necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril 
to life or great bodily injury].18' 
CALJIC 8.42 and 8.43 provide the primary source of guid-
ance for a jury when it applies a voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion. m The goal of the proposed modifications is to draft new 
pattern instructions which contemplate the battered woman's 
emotional trauma and view subsequent acts in a more accurate 
and deferential manner. A compatible goal is to remain within 
the confines of the legislature's disdain for mitigation doctrines. 
1. Present Instruction per CALJIC 8.42 
Current CALJIC 8.42 instructs as follows: 
"Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion and Provoca-
tion Explained: To reduce an intentional feloni-
ous homicide from the offense of murder to man-
slaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or 
heat of passion, the provocation must be of such 
character and degree as naturally would excite 
and arouse such passion, and the assailant must 
act under the influe.nce of that sudden quarrel or 
heat of passion. 
132. [d. at 100 (citing Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in 
Search of a Rationale, 73 J.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 425-29 (1982». 
133. See CALJIC 8.40. Vol. 1 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (defining voluntary man-
slaughter). 
134. Id. 
135. See CALJIC 8.42-8.43, Vol. 1 (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
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The heat of passion which will reduce a 
homicide to manslaughter must be such a passion 
as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an 
ordinarily reasonable person in the same circum-
stances. A defendant is not permitted to set up 
[his] [her] own standard of conduct and to justify 
or excuse [himself] [herself] because [his] [her] 
passions were aroused unless the circumstances in 
which the defendant was placed and the facts 
that confronted [him] [her] were such as also 
would have aroused the passion of the ordinarily 
reasonable person faced with the same situation. 
[Legally adequate provocation may occur in a 
short, or over a considerable, period of time.] 
The question to be answered is whether or 
not, at the time of the killing, the reason of the 
accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to 
such an extent as would cause the ordinarily rea-
sonable person of average disposition to act rashly 
and without deliberation and reflection, and from 
such passion rather than from judgment. 
If there was provocation, [whether of short or 
long duration,] but of a nature not normally suffi-
cient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time 
elapsed between the provocation and the fatal 
blow for passion to subside and reason to return, 
and if an unlawful killing of a human being fol-
lowed such provocation and had all the elements 
of murder, as I have defined it, the mere fact of 
slight or remote provocation will not reduce the 
offense to manslaughter."186 
2. CALJIC 8.42 Reuised137 
To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the of-
fense of murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of such char-
acter and degree as naturally would cause excitement and 
arousal to such passion in an ordinarily law-abiding person, 
136. CALJIC 8.42 (1991 Revision). 
137. The italicized portion indicates proposed revisions to the instruction. 
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and that person must act under the influence of that sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion. 
The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to man-
slaughter must be of such passion as naturally would cause an 
ordinarily law-abiding person to lose self-control in the same 
circumstances or situation. Relevant to the ordinarily law-abid-
ing person standard is evidence admitted at trial which either 
demonstrates, or fails to demonstrate, a history of conduct de-
picting a loss of control and excitability to commit violent un-
lawful acts. Where such person's ability to reason is frequently 
obscured or disturbed by some passion to act rashly or without 
due deliberation or reflection, then the loss of control and ex-
citability in the fact situation presented at trial ought to be 
viewed without consideration of the proffered explanation for 
extreme emotional disturbance above and beyond the fact situ-
ation immediate to the administration of the lethal act. 
Conversely, where the evidence proffered at trial suggests 
the perpetrator does not demonstrate a commonplace propen-
sity to excitability to such a degree that reason is obscured or 
disturbed by some passion causing that person to act rashly or 
without due. deliberation or reflection, where the loss of control 
resulting from the events appears to have provoked an other-
wise ordinarily law-abiding person, then it is proper to consider 
the totality of the admissible facts proffered by that person. 
The totality of facts shall include a reasonable explanation 
for extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the lethal act, 
even where such extreme emotional disturbance may encom-
pass events prior to the facts immediately surrounding the le-
thal act. A defendant is not permitted to set up [his] [her] own 
standard of conduct and to justify or excuse [himself] [herself] 
because [his] [her] passions were aroused unless the circum-
stances in which the defendant was placed and the facts con-
fronted [him] [her], were such as also would have aroused the 
passion of the ordinarily reasonable law-abiding person faced 
with the same situation, in light of the totality of the circum-
stances described above. 
The totality of the facts presented at trial which shall be 
considered in determining whether the defendant has proffered 
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evidence of legally adequate provocation may include facts 
which occur over a short or long period of time. 
Slight or remote provocation will not reduce an offense of 
murder where the unlawful killing of a human being otherwise 
satisfies all the elements of murder. Provocation which may 
otherwise appear slight or remote when viewed narrowly to the 
facts surrounding the administration of the lethal act may in 
fact be reasonable, and thus, shall be found to be legally ade-
quate where such provocation included other provoking circum-
stances arising slowly over time, where such ordinarily law-
abiding person is provoked to violence beyond the extent to 
which an ordinarily law-abiding person in similar circum-
stances or similarly situated would be expected to be provoked. 
If sufficient time elapsed between the provocation and the 
fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the prov-
ocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter. 
3. Significance of the CALJIC 8.42 Revisions 
The legal consequences of the modifications to CALJIC 8.42 
for a defendant who requests a voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion is not per se an effortless avenue to negating malice. The 
instruction broadens the scope of provocation by allowing the 
jury to consider anything which provides a reasonable explana-
tion for extreme emotional disturbance if it caused an otherwise 
law-abiding person to lose control. The standard of "law-abid-
ing" and "reasonable" furnishes a restraint on the application of 
the doctrine. A battering male who kills his wife in a fit of rage 
will not be afforded the broadened consideration of facts which 
would precipitate a finding of legally adequate provocation. On 
the other hand a battered woman, who is otherwise law abiding, 
but responds to the emotional trauma induced by her mate's ag-
gression and threats of violence, shall receive the broader con-
sideration. Expert testimony "negating the inference of a predis-
position to commit the charged crimes may be admissible as 
character evidence.ms8 
138. Susan Rutberg, Not Guilty By Reason of Victimization, 20 CACJ FORUM 36, 
40, No.4 (1993) (discussing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder's (PTSD) effect on the be-
havior of people who have survived a variety of traumatic experiences and the links be-
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A prosecutor who anticipates application of the proposed 
instruction will gather all admissible evidence which portrays 
the defendant as non-law abiding, or one who is easily provoked 
to lawless violence. In cases where the defendant's past acts pre-
clude this proposed deferential standard, a jury will be con-
strained to the immediate facts at the time of the lethal acts. 
The correct standard shall therefore be the objectively reasona-
ble standard. A pretrial inquiry into prior convictions for similar 
violent acts is pertinent to the determination whether the de-
fendant is within the law-abiding standard. In domestic violence 
cases, the number of police responses due to reports of unrest 
will be equally relevant. 
Use of prior bad acts will not violate California Evidence 
Code section 1101; that section precludes specific instances of 
defendant's prior conduct when offered to prove that his present 
conduct comported with those prior instances of bad acts.1S9 The 
distinction between the type of evidence invited under the modi-
fications to CALJIC 8.42 and the prohibitions delineated in sec-
tion 1101 is that a defendant would seek to present evidence of 
prior conduct to show conformity with the otherwise law-abiding 
standard. It is the defendant who places her good character at 
issue and then, the prosecution in turn, may rebut that evidence. 
A defendant would be entitled to a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction if such instruction is supported by substantial evi-
dence proffered at trial. When a homicide defendant seeks to 
benefit by the broadened provocation instruction, which would 
be available for otherwise law-abiding citizens, that defendant 
assumes the risk of prior specific instances of similar criminal 
conduct being proffered by the prosecution. 
In a criminal prosecution of a battered woman who kills, the 
broadened definition of provocation more aptly addresses the 
battered woman's plight than the present instruction which was 
derived to accommodate the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
weapon-toting male. The revised instruction implicitly invites 
testimony of battered woman syndrome. 
tween traumatic victimization and subsequent anti-social behavior). 
139. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 1100-1107 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993). 
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4. Present Instruction per CALJIC 8.43 
CALJIC 8.43 instructs the jury with a standard for analyz-
ing whether or not the defendant [in fact] acted under the pas-
sion aroused by the victim. The present instruction states: 
Cooling Period: To reduce a killing upori a sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion from murder to man-
slaughter the killing must have occurred while the 
slayer was acting under the direct and immediate 
influence of such quarrel or heat of passion. 
Where the influence of the sudden quarrel or heat 
of passion has ceased to obscure the mind of the 
accused and sufficient time has elapsed for angry 
passion to end and for reason to control his con-
duct, it will no longer reduce an intentional kill-
ing to manslaughter. The question as to whether 
the cooling period has elapsed and reason has re-
turned is not measured by the standard of the ac-
cused, but the duration of the cooling period is 
the amount of time it would take the average or 
ordinarily reasonable person to have cooled such 
passion and for that person's reason to have 
returned. 140 
5. CALJIC 8.43 Revised141 
"To reduce a killing upon a sudden quarrel, heat of passion 
or provocation from murder to manslaughter the killing must 
have occurred while the defendant was acting under the direct 
and immediate influence of such quarrel, heat of passion or pro-
voking circumstances. Where the influence of the sudden quar-
rel, heat of passion or provocation has ceased to obscure the 
mind of the accused and sufficient time has elapsed for the loss 
of control and obscured or disturbed reason to end, and where 
the ability to act with due deliberation and judgment returns, 
that influence will no longer reduce an intentional killing to 
mans laughter. 
The question as to whether the cooling period has elapsed 
140. See CALJIC 8.43. 
141. The italicized portions indicate revisions to the instruction. 
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and reason has returned shall be measured by the duration of 
time it would take the average or ordinarily reasonable person, 
who was similarly situated in the same facts and circumstances 
as proffered at trial and were proper for consideration under 
CALJIC 8.42, to have cooled such passion and for that person's 
reason to have returned." 
6. Significance of the CALJIC 8.43 Revisions 
By allowing the jury to consider all the facts which are rele-
vant to whether provocation was adequate, and whether the 
cooling period has passed, the battered woman's defensive ac-
tions are less likely to be seen as retaliatory. In Aris, the court 
held that her fear "must have subsided somewhat after the 
threats and assault ended."u2 The court also disregarded Aris' 
contention that her passion could not be subject to a standard 
cooling period because it was aroused by a series of events occur-
ring over a considerable period of time. us Accordingly, it is criti-
cal for a proper defense of a battered woman that the jury con-
sider battered woman syndrome and the totality of the facts and 
circumstances at the time of the fatal act. 
Aris believed that she would not live until morning.u4 The. 
need to secure a weapon prior to returning to her own home evi-
dences her state of mind prior to firing the fatal shot. Specifi-
cally, unless a woman suffered from a motivational and emo-
tional deficit, why would she leave a potentially safe-harbor and 
return to the home when she believed that she might not live 
until morning? Returning to the home suggests that her judg-
ment had not returned. A juror who does not suffer from bat-
tered woman syndrome, nor receives defense instructions which 
address that syndrome and the principles of learned helpless-
ness, may label the behavior of returning to the home and killing 
the sleeping abuser as a premeditated retaliatory action. 
A critical legal distinction exists between an isolated bat-
tering incident which may occur in a bar and one which occurs 
to a battered woman. If the batterer's violence and threats 
142. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 183. 
143. [d. 
144. See id. at 171. 
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which occurred the night of Aris' fatal actions were isolated, 
then it would be appropriate to exclusively consider the facts 
and circumstances in which she was placed at the time of the 
fatal shot. An isolated instance of abuse does not trigger the 
need for consideration of extraneous variables. When there is an 
on-going pattern of abuse, however, application of the present 
heat of passion or provocation doctrine is legally insufficient to 
provide a battered woman with a viable, gender-equal defense. 
D. NON-STATUTORY MANSLAUGHTER: IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE 
The other type of voluntary manslaughter, under the imper-
fect self-defense doctrine, continues to be recognized in Califor-
nia.1411 The non-statutory doctrine applies to "reduce an inten-
tional killing from murder to manslaughter when a person kills 
under an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to de-
fend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury."146 Ac-
cordingly, imperfect self-defense issues arise when a defender in-
tentionally kills an assailant with a belief which, although 
honestly held, fails to meet the reasonable person standard.147 
The California Supreme Court, in People u. Flannel, held that 
an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself 
from imminent peril to life negates malice aforethought.148 The 
Flannel doctrine arose under the following factual scenario: in a 
street brawl, the defendant shot the victim under a mistaken be-
lief that the victim approached him with a switchblade knife.149 
Compatible with the provocation and heat of passion defense, 
the imperfect self-defense doctrine arose under a circumstance 
of a sudden onset of force which would be present in an isolated 
145. People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 590 n.1 (Cal. 1991). The court granted review to 
resolve conflict in the courts of appeal concerning the impact of legislation abolishing 
diminished capacity on the crime of manslaughter. In affirming the first degree murder 
and attempted murder convictions, the California Supreme Court held that the law of 
the state no longer permits a reduction of murder to non·statutory manslaughter due to 
involuntary intoxication and/or mental disorder. Id. 
146. Id. (citing People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979». 
147. See Flannel, 603 P.2d at 4. 
148. Id. at 2. The court rejected defendant's argument that the court erred in failing 
to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that defendant's honest but unreasonable belief that he 
must defend himself from deadly attack negates malice to reduce the defense from mur· 
der to manslaughter. The unreasonable self·defense doctrine was not a general principle 
of law at that time; consequently, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on 
that defense. See id. 
149. Id. at 3. 
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aggressive situation. 
Although the Aris court instructed the jury on the imperfect 
self-defense doctrine, it nonetheless found the presence of mal-
ice.1110 The court held that Aris simply could not have main-
tained an honest belief in the need to defend herself from her 
sleeping husband's prior threats. By reforming the imperfect 
self-defense instruction to allow consideration of the heightened 
sensitivity to danger, which is intrinsic in a woman suffering 
from battered woman syndrome, the jury may view the battered 
woman's honest and genuine belief in a more deferential 
manner. 
1. Present Instruction per CALJIC 5.171111 
CALJIC 5.17 provides the instruction for an honest but un-
reasonable belief in the necessity to defend. Where the evidence 
warrants this instruction, it is usually provided in conjunction 
with CALJIC 8.40 which defines Voluntary Manslaughter. 
CALJIC 5.17 instructs a jury as follows: 
"A person, who kills another person in the honest 
but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend 
against imminent peril to life or great bodily in-
jury, kills unlawfully, but does not harbor malice 
aforethought and is not guilty of murder. This 
would be so even though a reasonable person in 
the same situation seeing and knowing the same 
facts would not have had the same belief. Such an 
honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense to 
the crime of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary] 
manslaughter. "IG2 
2. CALJIC 5.17 Revisedlll3 
In order for the defendant to harbor a reasonable belief in 
the necessity to defend against imminent peril, it is essential 
150. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 172. 
151. CALJIC 5.17, Vol. 1 (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
152. CALJIC 5.17, Vol. 1 (1988 & Sup. 1993). 
153. The italicized portions indicate revisions to the instruction. 
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that there is a present aggressor manifesting a threat to carry 
out previously threatened force. Where the defendant, at the 
time the fatal act occurred, harbored an honest, actual and 
genuine perception of the need to repel imminent peril, al-
though factually such belief is unreasonable, such defendant 
does not harbor malice. Relevant to the honesty of the defend-
ant's belief are the internal and external forces existing in the 
defendant's life which lend credence to the genuine need for 
subsequent defensive conduct against the present victim. Such 
an honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime 
of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary] manslaughter. 
3. Significance of the Revisions to CALJIC 5.17 
The revised portion of CALJIC 5.17 again implicitly enables 
the battered woman who kills to assert a defense which ad-
dresses battered woman syndrome. The modified instruction 
considers internal and external forces which are relevant to the 
defendant's genuine perception. Evidence of battered woman 
syndrome not only explains how a battered woman might think, 
react or behave, it places the behavior in an understandable 
light. How the fact-finders may think the average, reasonable 
person would behave, or how they think they personally would 
behave are not necessarily similar to the manner in which a bat-
tered woman may behave. Although the honesty of a defendant's 
belief is not viewed in an objective light, the jury might reach 
conclusions concerning the honesty of the belief based on their 
own good faith misconceptions. U4 
The proposed revisions to CALJIC 5.17 are consistent with 
the California Legislature's 1991 addition to the California Evi-
dence Code. Newly added section 1107 provides: "In a criminal 
action, expert testimony is admissible by either the prosecution 
or defense regarding battered women's syndrome, including the 
physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, percep-
tions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence .... "11111 Al-
though section 1107 was not intended to substantively alter the 
154. People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 925 (Ct. App. 1992) (reversing defendant's 
voluntary manslaughter conviction due to counsel's failure to investigate and present 
evidence of battered women's syndrome). 
155. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
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Penal Code,166 enactment of this section may be seen as an ac-
knowledgement of the misconceptions concerning battered wo-
man syndrome. Reform to the imperfect self-defense instruction, 
like the adoption of Evidence Code section 1107, directly en-
hances the battered woman who kills' chance for a fair defense. 
The revisions to CALJIC 5.17 will not apply to every de-
fendant seeking to negate malice through the honest but unrea-
sonable defense doctrine. The new language which permits con-
sideration of those "internal or external factors" which lend 
credence to the honest belief for the "genuine need to use force 
against the present victim" precludes evidence of a generalized 
diminished capacity. That is, a defendant who does not suffer 
from battered woman syndrome may not assert that he main-
tained a heightened perception to danger. In contrast, the de-
fendant who harbors a lower degree of culpability and who suf-
fers from battered woman syndrome or who acted under some 
other internal or external force must receive a defense instruc-
tion which addresses those factors. 
The motivational and emotional deficits Aris suffered are 
not present in the situation in which one must suddenly defend 
oneself in a brawl with a stranger. Battered women, therefore, 
have a valid argument that the legal defense instructions violate 
their right to an adequate criminal defense.1II7 Failure to con-
template the plight of a battered woman when administering the 
defense instructions precludes women like Aris from an ade-
quate defense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The addition of Evidence Code section 1107 allows the jury 
to consider battered woman syndrome when applying the crimi-
nal defense instructions to a fact situation. This initial reform 
provides the jury with insight into why a battered woman acts as 
she does. Only with added insight may a jury fairly decide the 
ultimate question whether there was a justified use of force or 
whether manslaughter is more appropriate than a murder ver-
156. Id. § l107(d). 
157. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV (guaranteeing right to due process of 
law). 
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dict. However, absent the reforms suggested above, a trial judge 
may continue to preclude a requested defense instruction for the 
battered woman who kills. Until defense instructions expressly 
or impliedly recognize extrinsic and internal factors which dis-
tort perceptions of danger and lead to emotional and motiva-
tional deficits, courts will continue to disregard a battered wo-
man who kills' lower culpability. Since a juror may never walk a 
day in Aris' shoes, or any other battered woman's, the jury must 
be provided with defense instructions which consider the plight 
of the battered woman in light of all the facts. Only then will the 
criminal defense doctrines ensure that the battered woman who 
refuses to take one more beating receives a fair trial. 
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